Azerbaijan.US
Recent statements by prominent Russian public figures questioning the sovereignty of former Soviet republics have reignited debate over whether Moscow poses a genuine military threat to Azerbaijan – or whether such rhetoric is primarily part of a broader information strategy.
The discussion was triggered by remarks from Russian political philosopher Alexander Dugin, who has argued that no former Soviet republic, including Azerbaijan, should exist as a fully sovereign state. Similar themes have been echoed by Russian television host Vladimir Solovyov, who has publicly speculated about the possibility of “special military operations” beyond Ukraine.
While neither figure holds formal government office, both are widely viewed as influential voices aligned with Kremlin narratives. As a result, their statements are often interpreted abroad not as personal opinions, but as informal signals testing regional reactions.
For Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet states, the sensitivity is historical. More than three decades after the collapse of the USSR, segments of Russia’s political and media establishment continue to frame the post-Soviet space through an imperial lens. This rhetoric has intensified since the start of the war in Ukraine, where Moscow justified military action through claims of historical entitlement and security necessity.
Security analysts caution, however, against conflating rhetoric with immediate military capability. Russia remains deeply engaged in Ukraine and has suffered substantial military, economic, and reputational losses. Opening an additional front against a well-armed, politically consolidated country such as Azerbaijan would represent a strategic overextension.
“There is a clear distinction between ideological messaging and operational reality,” analysts note. “At present, Russia lacks both the capacity and the strategic incentive for direct military action against Azerbaijan.”
That said, the absence of an imminent military threat does not eliminate risk altogether. Experts point to non-kinetic pressure – including information campaigns, political signaling, and attempts at regional influence – as more plausible tools Moscow may continue to use.
Similar concerns have been voiced across Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Georgia have all reacted sharply in recent years to statements challenging their sovereignty. In this sense, Azerbaijan’s concerns are part of a wider regional pattern rather than an isolated case.
Against this backdrop, analysts argue that Azerbaijan’s security calculus increasingly depends on regional coordination and strategic alliances. The country’s military partnership with Türkiye is widely seen as a key deterrent factor, while broader cooperation among Turkic states and regional actors further raises the political cost of any coercive move.
“The lesson of the post-2014 period is that collective signaling matters,” one regional expert said. “States that are embedded in alliances and regional frameworks are far harder to pressure individually.”
Ultimately, most experts agree that Russia’s current rhetoric reflects frustration and ideological inertia rather than an actionable military plan. Attempts to revive imperial influence in the 21st century, they argue, are more likely to accelerate Moscow’s isolation than restore its leverage.
For Azerbaijan, the challenge lies in maintaining vigilance without succumbing to alarmism – strengthening deterrence, deepening partnerships, and responding to revisionist narratives with diplomatic clarity rather than escalation.
