The armed conflict between Israel and Iran has come to an end just 12 days after it began, U.S. President Donald Trump announced via social media.
But what did the world really gain—or lose—from this confrontation? How did the limited U.S. involvement shape the outcome? And what does this short-lived war mean for the South Caucasus region, particularly for Azerbaijan?
According to Farhad Mammadov, head of the Center for South Caucasus Studies, the conclusion of the Israel-Iran war is anything but conventional.
“If this really is the end of the war, it’s highly unusual,” Mammadov told 1news.az. “There’s no formal peace deal between Israel and Iran. Diplomatic fundamentals haven’t changed—Iran still doesn’t recognize Israel, and Israel hasn’t secured any firm commitments from Iran to halt its nuclear program, which was the main justification for launching the strikes.”
The ceasefire, he noted, is based on a verbal agreement—without any UN Security Council resolution—and marks yet another conflict fought outside the framework of international law, leaving the door wide open for future escalation.
Mammadov described this as a new type of warfare, one between non-neighboring nations relying primarily on drones and missile strikes. The U.S. joined in as a third key player, with American military bases in the region becoming targets, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.
“Washington used this window of opportunity to weaken Iran on three fronts: its regional influence, its nuclear program, and its missile capabilities,” Mammadov said. “The U.S., along with Israel, inflicted serious damage—though not total destruction. Still, it was enough to shift the balance.”
As for President Trump, Mammadov called him one of the most quoted political figures globally, noting his continued efforts to project international victories tied to his administration’s policies.
South Caucasus at Risk
Mammadov warned that the Israel-Iran conflict posed significant risks for the South Caucasus.
“For our region, this war was a serious threat—from the potential spread of radiation, to internal instability in Iran, to the humanitarian fallout,” he said. “While we can breathe a little easier now under a fragile ceasefire, all eyes should remain on Iran’s internal dynamics. The war has weakened one of our key neighbors.”
He added that Iran’s next steps would be crucial—whether it chooses a path of recovery and cooperation or lashes out unpredictably in response to the damage it suffered.
“I expect Iran to combine a more constructive tone with bursts of aggressive rhetoric. The damage to its military infrastructure and the psychological blow to its people—who no longer feel safe—are significant. The social contract between the Iranian government and its population has been broken, and how the people respond remains to be seen.”
Azerbaijan’s Calculated Neutrality
The war is likely to change Azerbaijan-Iran relations, Mammadov noted. But Iran should take note of Baku’s restraint.
“Azerbaijan mirrored Iran’s own past behavior. Our territory and airspace were not used against Iran, and that’s the maximum Tehran should expect,” he said.
Looking ahead, Mammadov believes the conflict could open the door for deeper regional cooperation.
“Azerbaijan remains open to constructive dialogue with Iran. In fact, Iran may now be more willing to engage in joint infrastructure and transport projects—like the North-South Corridor and the Araz Corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. These projects could help Iran attract investment and start repairing its war-hit economy.”
