Baku, September 22, 2025
Russia is facing steep losses in its energy trade. According to Reuters, Moscow expects $200.3 billion in oil and gas export revenue in 2025 – down 15 percent from $235 billion in 2024, and roughly 40 percent lower than pre-sanctions levels in 2022. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CRECA) estimates Russia has forfeited about €153 billion since EU sanctions took effect, forcing it to pivot sales to Asia.
China now buys nearly half of Russia’s crude exports, while India takes about 38 percent. But both are seen as unreliable partners: India’s market is volatile, and China’s cooperation is more about exploiting Moscow’s weakness than building trust.
Azerbaijan as Rival
Before the war in Ukraine, Russia supplied around 30–40 percent of Europe’s natural gas and about 25–30 percent of its oil. Now, after sanctions, it is struggling to regain a foothold. Meanwhile, Europe is implementing its REPowerEU strategy to cut dependence on Russian energy, diversify suppliers, and accelerate renewables.
Azerbaijan has become a crucial alternative. A 2022 Memorandum of Strategic Partnership with the EU set the goal of doubling gas supplies to Europe to 20 billion cubic meters annually by 2027, up from just 8.1 bcm in 2021. Baku has also advanced the long-delayed Trans-Caspian Pipeline with Turkmenistan, while new “green corridor” agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan aim to deliver Central Asia’s solar and wind power to Europe through Azerbaijan.
From Moscow’s perspective, this positions Azerbaijan not as a partner, but as a direct competitor. And Russia rarely plays by market rules.
The Ahmadzade Affair
Against this backdrop comes the arrest of Adnan Ahmadzade, former deputy head of SOCAR’s investment department. Officially, he is accused of embezzlement and economic sabotage, including lowering the quality of Azerbaijani crude exports.
Investigators allege he was not merely misappropriating funds but enabling sanctions evasion. Russian crude, under Western restrictions, was blended into Azerbaijan’s premium Azeri Light shipments and sold abroad as Azerbaijani. The result: Russian oil slipped into global markets disguised as Azeri Light.
The impact was immediate. The dilution pushed the benchmark price of Azeri Light down from $75 to $68.31 a barrel – a loss of $6.69 per barrel. Azerbaijan’s export revenues fell by an estimated $2.01 billion, nearly 1 percent of GDP.
But the losses were not just financial. Ahmadzade’s actions shook Azerbaijan’s credibility as a reliable supplier and tainted its flagship export brand. European officials have already voiced concern.
For that reason, his “concession to Russia’s machinations” is seen not only as fraud, but as deliberate sabotage against the national interest.
Russian Messaging
Controversial Russian blogger and Kremlin propagandist Yuri Podolyaka added fuel to the fire on August 20. In a social media post, he highlighted Azerbaijan’s export problems and pegged the financial damage at between $420 million and $770 million. He broke down the alleged losses as follows:
$350 million from five shipments that European partners refused to process,
$70 million from delays linked to a “contaminated” oil tanker,
$420 million from six cargoes withheld at the Ceyhan terminal,
and an additional $30 million a day from SOCAR’s reduced price premium on exports.
Podolyaka then shifted from numbers to politics. He suggested the scandal was a direct consequence of Azerbaijan aligning itself with a “British-Turkish alliance” and moving against Russian interests. His warning was blunt: “Any such incident can be repeated at any time.” In other words, the sabotage of Azerbaijani oil exports could become systematic if Baku does not reconsider its alliances.
A Broader Pattern
Such rhetoric fits a long-established Russian pattern: using energy as a political weapon. From gas cut-offs to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 to today’s shadow tactics, Moscow has consistently leveraged supply disruptions for geopolitical gain. Europe, learning from experience, is now determined to diversify away from Russia – with Azerbaijan one of its chosen partners.
Moscow, however, sees Baku’s rising role as a threat. The Ahmadzade case, with its mix of economic sabotage and propaganda spin, bears all the hallmarks of Russia’s hybrid playbook: infiltrate, disrupt, then narrate the crisis on Moscow’s terms.
Whether Ahmadzade acted alone or as part of a wider network remains unclear. Given the complexity of global oil sales and the scale of the losses, few believe it was the work of one man. For now, all the trails lead back to Moscow.
By Bizim.Media Analytical Group
