Azerbaijan.US
The South Caucasus is once again moving into a period of heightened geopolitical risk – not because of renewed hostilities between regional states, but due to mounting external pressures that could destabilize the region against the will of its governments.
According to political analyst and Chairman of the South Caucasus Studies CenterFarhad Mamedov, the region remains a geopolitical frontier where conflicts tend to emerge not by local choice, but through the logic of larger power struggles.
A Region at a Fragile Moment
Azerbaijan has emerged from a decades-long conflict, restored its sovereignty, and for the first time in years secured a realistic chance at long-term stability. Paradoxically, this moment of relative calm coincides with growing uncertainty around the region.
The risk, Mamedov argues, is not rooted in Baku, Yerevan, or Tbilisi – but in developments beyond their borders.
Iran: Instability Without a Front Line
The most serious source of potential instability is Iran. The threat is not limited to a direct military confrontation involving the United States or Israel. Rather, the greater danger lies in the possibility of internal collapse – a loss of control, factional struggle, or civil conflict within Iran itself.
Such a scenario would have immediate spillover effects. Civil unrest or fragmentation could push violence closer to Azerbaijan’s southern borders, creating security challenges even without deliberate aggression toward Baku.
In this context, chaos – not missiles – represents the primary risk.
External Strikes vs. Internal Collapse
Mamedov outlines two broad scenarios.
The first involves limited external strikes aimed at weakening Iran’s military or strategic capabilities. This path, while destabilizing, is relatively contained.
The second – far more dangerous – scenario is an internal breakdown of authority, where radical or uncontrolled actors gain influence. In such conditions, irrational decisions and uncontrolled escalation become possible, particularly near borders.
Azerbaijan’s Position: Borders First, No Proxy Role
Azerbaijan, Mamedov stresses, has no interest in participating in any external military campaign against Iran. Neither the United States nor Israel require Azerbaijani involvement for operational purposes.
Baku’s priority is defensive: securing its borders and preventing the spread of instability. Should security threats approach Azerbaijan’s territory, the response would focus strictly on containment and protection – not intervention.
Coordination With Turkey – and Quiet Regional Dialogue
In the event of serious deterioration, Azerbaijan would act in close coordination with Turkey under their existing strategic alliance. At the same time, Mamedov does not rule out limited consultations with Armenia, and potentially trilateral discussions involving Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
All three states share a border with Iran and have a mutual interest in preventing chaos from crossing into the South Caucasus.
This would not imply political alignment, but pragmatic risk management.
Russia: A Constrained but Persistent Factor
Russia remains another variable. Despite being heavily engaged in Ukraine, Moscow still possesses tools of influence in the South Caucasus. However, its capacity for large-scale military action in the region is currently limited.
The level of risk, Mamedov suggests, depends largely on the broader relationship between Moscow and Washington. A sharp deterioration could increase pressure on peripheral regions, including the South Caucasus.
Armenia and the Risk of Internal Reversal
While Armenia currently lacks the resources for escalation, internal political shifts could change the equation. A return of hardline or openly pro-Russian forces could revive confrontational narratives and invite greater external involvement.
For now, this remains a secondary risk – but one that cannot be fully dismissed.
A Region Trying to Avoid Other People’s Wars
The defining feature of the current moment is regional restraint. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia all show a strong preference for avoiding entanglement in external conflicts.
Peace initiatives, infrastructure reopening, and cautious diplomacy are not signs of weakness, but attempts to reduce vulnerability in an increasingly unpredictable global environment.
Conclusion
The South Caucasus is not seeking confrontation. Yet geography and geopolitics offer no guarantees.
As external crises deepen – from Iran to Ukraine – the region faces the challenge of preserving stability without becoming a theater for other powers’ conflicts. Azerbaijan’s strategy, as outlined by Mamedov, is clear: protect sovereignty, secure borders, avoid proxy roles, and keep diplomatic channels open.
In today’s world, restraint itself has become a strategic choice.
