Yerevan, September 30, 2025
Recent commentary by Armenian political scientist Norair Dunamalyan, delivered on the ReOpen Media Russian channel, offers a window into how Yerevan’s shifting course is reshaping both its ties with Moscow and the regional balance of power.
His analysis underscores a fundamental transformation of Russia–Armenia relations, Armenia’s cautious European pivot, and the growing weight of transport and energy corridors that now define the geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
Russia-Armenia: From Alliance to “Stable Problems”
Dunamalyan characterizes bilateral relations since 2020 as “stably problematic.” The end of the Karabakh factor, which long anchored Armenia’s dependence on Russia, has altered both official ties and public perceptions. What remains, however, is structural dependency: Armenia still relies on Russia for energy, transport infrastructure, and security guarantees, even as political rhetoric leans Westward.
The so-called European integration course, he argues, remains largely declarative, aimed at mobilizing domestic support ahead of Armenia’s 2026 elections. Yerevan highlights “EU standards” without committing to full accession, using the rhetoric to signal independence while avoiding irreversible breaks with Moscow.
Moscow’s Cautious Posture
Russia, distracted by the war in Ukraine, has avoided escalating tensions with Yerevan into open conflict. Instead, it pursues a mixed approach: applying economic and trade pressure while maintaining soft diplomatic engagement.
Dunamalyan stresses that Moscow understands Armenia cannot quickly escape its dependency on Russian gas, railways, or nuclear energy. Russia thus retains levers of influence, even as its traditional image as a security guarantor erodes.
The Security Architecture After 2020
The Second Karabakh War and the 2023 exodus of Armenians from Karabakh dismantled the old balance of power. Azerbaijan’s influence is rising, while Turkey, Iran, and broader Middle Eastern dynamics—from the Iran–Israel standoff to transport corridors linking China to Europe-are reshaping the South Caucasus map.
In this environment, Dunamalyan argues, it is no longer accurate to describe Russia as the guarantor of regional security. Instead, a new, undefined security system is emerging, with no single hegemon.
Transport Corridors: The Real Battleground
Beyond politics, infrastructure may prove decisive. Moscow’s strategic priority is the North-South Corridor, linking Russia to Iran and India. Without it, Russia risks marginalization from Eurasian trade flows. By contrast, the Middle Corridor-stretching from China through Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe-bypasses Russia and is promoted as a geopolitical tool of isolation rather than purely an economic route.
Here Armenia faces exclusion. Turkish-backed rail links from Kars to Nakhchivan avoid Armenian territory, leaving only a narrow 42-kilometer stretch through Syunik. Dunamalyan warns that by 2030-2032, when many of these projects are completed, Armenia risks being left on the sidelines of Eurasian connectivity.
Kazakhstan, the U.S., and China
On U.S.–Kazakh cooperation, Dunamalyan is skeptical. He sees Astana’s purchase of American locomotives as symbolic, reflecting Kazakhstan’s desire to deepen ties with Washington. By contrast, China’s investments in railways and logistics across Central Asia carry far more weight, as they build permanent infrastructure rather than transactional trade.
Oil, Sanctions, and Azerbaijan’s Resilience
Turning to energy, Dunamalyan noted EU restrictions on Azerbaijani tankers as a reputational blow, but not a systemic threat. Azerbaijan retains close partners in Italy and the U.K. willing to import hydrocarbons, giving Baku room to maneuver. More importantly, Azerbaijan lacks the volumes to supply all of Europe; its significance lies in the Southern Gas Corridor-TANAP and TAP pipelines-that feed Southern Europe and the Balkans.
He also suggested speculation that Russian oil and gas transit through Azerbaijani and Turkish routes adds a layer of geopolitical complexity. Meanwhile, strikes against SOCAR infrastructure in Ukraine are damaging but not decisive for Azerbaijan’s overall energy strategy.
Pragmatism Over Ideology
Dunamalyan’s analysis suggests that Armenia’s proclaimed Western course is constrained by structural realities. Russia, though weakened, retains tools of leverage, while Azerbaijan grows stronger as a transit and energy hub. The decisive arena will be infrastructure-pipelines, railways, and corridors-that will shape the balance of power into the 2030s.
In his view, Russia’s foreign policy has grown more “pragmatic,” focusing on Ukraine, Belarus, and immediate geopolitical fronts, while tolerating Armenia’s rhetorical flirtation with the EU. For Yerevan, however, the risk is strategic marginalization: caught between aspirations for Europe and the hard geography of transport routes bypassing its territory.
