Yerevan, September 9
Sociologist Georgi Derluguian of NYU Abu Dhabi urged caution against grand narratives in the South Caucasus, arguing that politics in the region is driven less by master plans than by human error, misread signals and “very bright consequences from very dull, simple causes.” His remarks came in an interview with the ArmComedy YouTube channel recorded in Yerevan.
In a wide-ranging conversation touching on Armenia–Azerbaijan talks, Russia’s war in Ukraine and shifting regional alignments, Derluguian sketched a pragmatic path for the Caucasus that emphasizes time, incrementalism and consent over coercive “big bang” solutions.
A deal that’s initialed, not done
Derluguian downplayed hype surrounding a recently initialed Armenia–Azerbaijan text, noting it has not been fully signed or implemented. The immediate priority, he said, is to buy time as the military and political balance between the two states rebalance after years of upheaval.
“Today’s line is a positional stalemate,” he said, describing a configuration that discourages adventurism.
Hard, maximalist clauses risk snapping under pressure; softer, reversible steps can build habits and reduce incentives for escalation.
Corridors in the drone age
On the proposed Zangezur corridor, Derluguian called a forced transit both technically possible and strategically pointless without Armenian consent. In a battlespace saturated with cheap, small drones, “any route is inexpensive to disrupt,” he said.
“You can punch through. The question is: who will keep it open, at what cost, and for how long?”
That logic, he suggested, pushes all sides toward negotiated access and redundancy – multiple routes, layered guarantees and economics that stand on their own.
The United States and the art of the “signal”
Derluguian characterized a modest U.S. role as transactional nudging rather than high diplomacy. The larger hazard, he argued, lies in misread signals – elites telegraphing intentions in hints and winks, then drawing the wrong conclusions. “This is as old as the mafia and as modern as geopolitics,” he said, warning that over-interpreting gestures can produce self-inflicted crises.
Russia’s limits – and costs that stick
Pushing back on claims that wartime Russia has grown stronger and self-sufficient, Derluguian called the 2022 invasion a “huge strategic error.” War can mobilize factories, he said, but true autarky is difficult without machine tools, talent and predictable budgets. Whatever happens at the front, the strategic ledger already includes a more mobilized Ukraine and Finland and Sweden in NATO – long-term costs Moscow cannot wish away.
Armenia’s politics: smaller wins, steadier footing
At home, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan benefits from constitutional protections and from framing partial steps as “victories.” But Derluguian said the electorate is shifting toward younger, technically competent “own kids” – a cohort of technocrats and veterans who value effective administration over grandstanding. He pointed to small civic wins – restaurants cutting loud music at 11 p.m., for example—as signals of a state that can enforce basic rules.
Azerbaijan: competence and concentration
For Azerbaijan, Derluguian sees a capable, centralized state whose main risks are succession dynamics and street-level grievance over uneven development. The threat is less external war, he suggested, than internal pressure if economic gains feel distant from everyday life. In such systems, change often arrives through elite reshuffles rather than elections.
The Caucasus and “two Russias”
Derluguian drew a distinction between what he called two Russias: the Russia of writers, scientists and professionals, many of whom found refuge in Yerevan and Tbilisi, and the Russia of television bravado. The former, he argued, “remembers who sheltered it” and constitutes a cultural bridge; the latter’s ability to project power into the Caucasus is diminishing.
“They can spoil things,” he said. “They can’t send an armored train anymore.”
Strategy: plan hard, improvise smart
Quoting the Prussian strategist Helmuth von Moltke, Derluguian defined strategy as achieving objectives with whatever is at hand – detailed plans on the shelf, paired with field-level initiative. In today’s bureaucracies, he added, that often means empowering capable women and younger officers/analysts outside traditional “old boys” circuits.
What endures
Derluguian’s through line was unsentimental:
Don’t overread: Most moves are improvised; beware conspiracy-shaped stories.
Peace is iterative: Build habits and incentives; avoid brittle clauses.
Corridors need consent: Coercion is cheap to sabotage in the drone era.
Russia’s war dividend is thin: Security losses outlast wartime output spikes.
Armenia’s edge: Civic vitality, tech-leaning youth, and reputational capital as a safe harbor.
The sociologist closed with a survival metaphor borrowed from early modern Europe: small states should behave like a cat – seeing well, moving between giants, and “scratching hard if cornered.”
The views expressed are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of the site.
