By Azerbaijan.US Editorial Board
For much of the past two decades, the European Union has portrayed itself as a normative power in the South Caucasus – a region where values, mediation, and institutional engagement were supposed to translate into influence. Today, that assumption no longer holds.
Europe has not been pushed out of the South Caucasus by force, nor displaced by a single rival actor. Instead, it has gradually lost leverage through its own strategic choices, as the region’s political and security realities evolved faster than Brussels was willing to adapt.
From mediator to moral arbiter
At its peak, the EU’s role in the South Caucasus rested on balance. Brussels positioned itself as a facilitator – cautious, incremental, and attentive to regional sensitivities. That posture has since shifted.
In recent years, European engagement has become increasingly moralized and politicized, especially in the context of Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. Parliamentary activism, advocacy-driven narratives, and selective framing of conflicts have replaced pragmatic mediation. As a result, Europe has come to be seen less as a neutral broker and more as a political actor with preferences.
This matters because peace processes are built on trust – and trust erodes quickly when one side believes the mediator has already chosen a narrative.
The Washington factor
The contrast with the U.S. approach is instructive. The most tangible progress toward Armenian–Azerbaijani normalization did not emerge from EU-led formats, but from U.S.-facilitated diplomacy, particularly the Washington track that emphasized security guarantees, connectivity, and economic logic.
Initiatives such as the TRIPP framework focused on reopening transport routes, reducing escalation risks, and embedding peace in regional interdependence. These were not symbolic gestures; they were structural proposals.
Yet rather than integrating this agenda, European policy has often appeared reluctant to acknowledge a peace architecture shaped outside Brussels. The absence of key U.S.-brokered elements from recent EU–Armenia documents was not merely an oversight – it reflected an institutional discomfort with losing agenda-setting power.
Selective principles, diminishing credibility
Europe’s loss of leverage is also rooted in inconsistency. The EU has been unequivocal in defending the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. In the South Caucasus, however, the same principle was long treated as negotiable.
Before 2020, Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories was frequently described in European discourse as a “disputed status” rather than a violation of international law. This selective application of principles weakened Europe’s credibility long before the current peace process began.
When norms are applied unevenly, they stop functioning as norms – and become tools. Regional actors notice the difference.
Monitoring without neutrality
The EU’s civilian monitoring mission in Armenia further illustrates this dilemma. Deployed without Azerbaijan’s consent and lacking a regionally endorsed mandate, the mission was framed as a confidence-building measure. In practice, it became another source of friction.
Rather than reinforcing trust, the mission reinforced perceptions of asymmetry – particularly as its activities were not embedded in a mutually agreed security framework. For Baku, this confirmed a broader concern: that European involvement was drifting from facilitation toward positioning.
In peacebuilding, perception is often as consequential as intent.
Sanctions, symbolism, and strategic drift
Europe’s recent sanctions targeting Azerbaijani entities underscore the same pattern. While EU member states continue to import Russian energy, transport sanctioned goods via third countries, and tolerate loopholes in enforcement, selective measures against Azerbaijan appear less like principled policy and more like symbolic signaling.
Symbolism, however, is not leverage. Leverage requires consistency, material incentives, and a clear understanding of regional power balances – all of which have weakened in Europe’s current approach.
A region moving on
The South Caucasus today is not what it was ten years ago. Azerbaijan has consolidated territorial control, expanded its role as an energy and transit hub, and pursued a foreign policy based on strategic autonomy rather than alignment. Armenia, meanwhile, faces its own recalibration, driven by security realities rather than external encouragement.
In this environment, influence flows not from declarations or resolutions, but from relevance. Actors who can contribute to stability, connectivity, and security retain a seat at the table. Those who rely on moral pressure without strategic backing do not.
Europe’s choice
Europe’s loss of leverage in the South Caucasus is not irreversible. But recovery would require a shift away from ideological framing and toward realism – recognizing that peace cannot be monopolized, narratives cannot substitute for outcomes, and regional agency cannot be overridden by parliamentary activism.
Until then, European engagement will continue to generate visibility without influence – present in discourse, but peripheral in decision-making.
The region has already moved on. The question is whether Europe is prepared to catch up.
