Azerbaijan.US
Questions about whether Turkey and Azerbaijan might support protest movements in Iran tend to resurface during periods of political tension inside the country. Yet a closer look at regional dynamics shows that neither Ankara nor Baku is interested in radical destabilization or scenarios involving the fragmentation of the Iranian state.
This position is not situational or tied to any single wave of unrest. It reflects a long-standing regional logic shaped by geography, security concerns, and the balance of power in the broader Middle East and South Caucasus.
Territorial integrity as a strategic constant
For both Turkey and Azerbaijan, Iran is not simply a neighboring country but a central pillar of regional stability. The preservation of Iran’s territorial integrity and basic governability is viewed as a core security interest.
A weakened central authority, the spread of centrifugal forces, or the emergence of uncontrolled political entities inside Iran would pose direct risks to neighboring states. Countries with long borders, ethnic linkages, and complex regional environments would be the first to feel the consequences of such instability.
From this perspective, the collapse or fragmentation of Iran is not seen as an opportunity, but as a source of long-term uncertainty.
Why rapid disintegration is viewed as dangerous
Regional experience suggests that the sudden breakdown of large states rarely leads to stability or democratic consolidation. More often, it produces:
the rise of informal armed groups,
intensified competition among external actors,
prolonged security vacuums,
humanitarian crises and displacement.
In such environments, newly formed power centers tend to pursue their own survival through confrontation, often at the expense of neighboring countries. This is why Ankara and Baku approach “fast-change” scenarios with caution and skepticism.
External influence and the balance of power
Another key concern is the role of external actors. When a state weakens internally, space opens for outside powers to shape outcomes in ways that may not align with regional interests.
From the standpoint of Turkey and Azerbaijan, the emergence of a new political entity under heavy external influence – rather than genuine domestic consensus – would fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. This could constrain their strategic maneuverability and introduce new security challenges.
As a result, support for radical protest scenarios is often seen not as solidarity with society, but as a potential gateway to deeper instability and external control.
Gradual reform over abrupt transformation
Avoiding radical scenarios does not mean endorsing stagnation or rejecting change altogether. On the contrary, both Ankara and Baku tend to favor gradual, internally driven reform within Iran over sudden and uncontrolled transformations.
Incremental political modernization, the expansion of civil and cultural rights, and the gradual reduction of rigid governance mechanisms are viewed as safer paths than abrupt systemic collapse. The emphasis is placed on legitimacy, continuity, and internal evolution rather than pressure imposed from outside.
The place of Iranian Azerbaijanis in this approach
The issue of Iranian Azerbaijanis occupies a special place in this calculus. From Baku’s perspective, protecting linguistic, cultural, and social rights is best pursued through sustainable and lawful mechanisms rather than through scenarios that risk widespread violence or state breakdown.
Long-term stability is seen as a prerequisite for meaningful progress on rights and representation. Confrontation and chaos, by contrast, are likely to delay or reverse such gains.
Conclusion
Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s approach to Iran is guided less by emotion and more by a sober assessment of regional risks. The expectation that Ankara or Baku would openly support radical protest movements misunderstands the underlying logic of their foreign policy.
For both countries, a unified and governable Iran – capable of gradual reform and internal adaptation – remains the least destabilizing option for the region. This pragmatic outlook explains why calls for rapid, externally driven change do not translate into official support, even during periods of heightened internal tension.
