In the latest episode of the “Week in Review” podcast on Armenian outlet CivilNet, journalist Arshaluis Mgdesyan and political analyst Sergey Minasyan unpacked two debates that, at first glance, seem unrelated:
the arrival of wheat in Armenia via a rail route through Azerbaijan, and
a bitter argument over whether Armenia’s air defense system in 2020 was effectively “scrap metal.”
Stay Ahead with Azerbaijan.usGet exclusive translations, top stories, and analysis — straight to your inbox.
Taken together, the two discussions reveal how tightly Armenia’s economic choices, security failures and pre-election politics are now intertwined.
Wheat Through Azerbaijan: Symbolic Route, Big Political Weight
The immediate trigger for the debate was news that two freight trains carrying wheat had reached Armenia along a route Russia/Kazakhstan → Azerbaijan → Georgia → Armenia. Technically, this is not direct Armenia–Azerbaijan transit, but the mere fact that cargo crossed Azerbaijani territory before reaching Armenia sparked intense discussion in Yerevan.
The questions piled up quickly:
Is this the beginning of unblocking transport links between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
Does the route offer a real chance to diversify imports and reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russian grain?
Or is it mostly a political gesture with limited economic effect?
Minasyan is cautious. From a strictly economic perspective, he argues, one or two trains cannot change the structure of Armenia’s market. They will not dramatically affect prices or break the dominance of Russian supplies in the short term. For now, the route is more important as a signal than as an economic breakthrough.
He stresses that a genuine “unblocking” of regional communications would mean something much bigger:
rail and road links that would allow cargo to reach Armenia directly through Azerbaijan – whether via Ijevan, Meghri, or the Erazd corridor. That would be a systemic shift. The current movements are, in его словах, “partial and limited” – politically useful, but not yet a change of rules.
Moscow’s Nerves: Grain, Transit and the SVR
The wheat trains appeared against the background of mounting tension between Yerevan and Moscow. The new route became even more sensitive after Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a public statement accusing Armenia of trying to reduce its “grain dependence” on Russia, including by seeking supplies from Ukraine using alternative transit corridors.
Armenia reacted sharply. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov then stepped in, insisting that SVR statements “are never baseless.” In Yerevan, this was perceived as another example of Moscow using security structures, rather than diplomatic channels, to signal its displeasure.
For Minasyan, the SVR’s intervention is revealing on several levels:
The grain issue carries for Moscow not only economic, but also political and psychological significance.
The SVR has, in recent years, become a public political actor, commenting not only on Armenia but also on Georgia, Ukraine and Western states.
Russia clearly sees that Armenia is trying to diversify both its foreign policy and its economic ties – and does not like it, even if, for now, it can respond mostly in the information and propaganda sphere because of its military entanglement in Ukraine.
At the same time, Minasyan reminds his audience that transport routes are not the real foundation of Armenia’s dependence on Russia. The deeper roots lie in:
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,
shared tariff and pricing regimes,
and long-standing preferential conditions for gas, fuel and key imports.
A single new rail route through Azerbaijan, by itself, does not overturn this system. It may complicate Moscow’s calculations, but only a broader shift in Armenia’s foreign and security policy could truly change the balance.
Signals Before the Vote
Minasyan also situates the wheat story firmly in the electoral calendar. Parliamentary elections are expected in Armenia next year, and the government has invested heavily in a “peace agenda” built around normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
In his view, over the coming months:
Azerbaijan and Turkey are likely to send more such “small signals” – from specific transit arrangements to targeted gestures of cooperation.
These moves will be calibrated to show that the peace track is alive, while stopping short of irreversible steps such as full opening of borders or large-scale infrastructure projects.
The Armenian authorities will then be able to present these developments as evidence that their policy of dialogue and compromise is delivering concrete results – however limited for now.
Minasyan does not expect major breakthroughs before the vote. Full-scale opening of the Turkish or Azerbaijani borders, or the launch of major new corridors, would be left for the next phase – if the political balance in Armenia after elections allows it.
From Grain to “Scrap Metal”: The Air Defense Row
If the transit story is about future options, the second topic is about the wounds of the past.
Former president Serzh Sargsyan recently claimed in a podcast that during the 44-day war in 2020, Armenia lost around half of its air defense systems in just one or two days. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan fired back, saying that much of what had been purchased earlier by previous governments and put into service was essentially “scrap metal”.
Minasyan urges listeners to look beyond the slogans.
Both sides are politicising the issue, he notes, but each is leaning on real, if incomplete, facts.
On the one hand, part of Armenia’s air defense inventory really was technologically outdated and poorly adapted to modern drone warfare. On the other, several important systems acquired under previous administrations did perform relatively well in combat.
He gives a concrete example:
TOR systems (short-range Russian-made SAMs) were ordered under previous governments and deliveries began before 2018. They performed relatively well during the 2020 war and later conflicts in other theatres, from Ukraine to Libya.
By contrast, a large batch of Osa (Osa-AK, Osa-AKM) systems was purchased from Jordan. Technically they were in decent condition, but by 2020 they were already poorly suited to counter sophisticated UAVs such as the Bayraktar.
In other words, these systems were not literally “scrap metal” – but without modernization and proper integration, they were disastrously vulnerable.
The Real Failure: Doctrine and Command
For Minasyan, the key problem lies not only in what Armenia bought, but how it was used.
He underlines several questions that remain unanswered:
How were air defense assets deployed and commanded in the weeks and days before 27 September 2020?
Насколько грамотной была система управления, распределения ответственности и децентрализации?
Why were some of Armenia’s most modern electronic warfare and air defense systems lost early on due to questionable decisions about their positioning and employment?
He points out that the war in Ukraine has shown another important lesson:
even legacy Soviet systems from the 1960s and 70s can be effective when they are upgraded with new radars, missiles and integrated into a modern command-and-control network. Conversely, cutting-edge equipment can be squandered by poor doctrine and weak leadership.
In this sense, the Armenian debate about “scrap metal” risks masking a deeper institutional failure: the absence of a modern, coherent concept of warfare adapted to drone-heavy, network-centric conflicts.
New Weapons, Old Questions
After 2020, Yerevan has declared a turn to a new era of armaments – purchases from France, India and other partners, while still relying on some Russian and Soviet stock.
But that shift brings fresh challenges:
Armenia is moving from an almost purely Russian-designed arsenal to a mixed ecosystem of Western, Indian and Russian systems.
Integrating different standards of communication, logistics and training into a single operational system is complex and costly.
Mistakes in doctrine or command will not disappear just because the labels on the equipment have changed.
Minasyan draws attention in particular to the ongoing discussion about possible purchases of Su-30 fighter jets in India. It is, по его оценке, a strategic question, not просто закупка ещё одного вида оружия.
Yes, Armenia needs an air force.
But modern aviation is extremely expensive and demanding in terms of infrastructure, specialists and time.
Putting such a capability on a truly combat-ready footing can take many years and billions of dollars – and no one can guarantee that these aircraft will still be relevant to the character of warfare in 5–10 years’ time.
Without a serious public and expert debate about what kind of war Armenia is preparing for, Minasyan warns, there is a risk of repeating old mistakes in a new configuration.
Between Dependence and Autonomy
Both of CivilNet’s topics this week – wheat trains through Azerbaijan and “scrap metal” air defense – are, в сущности, about one и ту же проблему.
Armenia is trying to:
loosen old dependencies – economic, logistic, military;
rethink its security architecture after a painful defeat;
and do all this in a highly charged political environment, with elections on the horizon and external actors watching every step.
The question is whether the country can move beyond slogans – “diversification” on one side, “scrap metal” on the other – and build a sober, long-term vision of how it feeds itself, how it defends itself, and how it navigates a region where every freight train and every radar system has become a political signal.
