Baku, September 20, 2025
On CBC TV Azerbaijan’s daily public-affairs show, commentators Jeyhun Mollazade – a political analyst and former acting chargé d’affaires of Azerbaijan in the United States – and Ilgar Velizade, a political analyst with a PhD in economics, argued that the September 19–20, 2023 “local anti-terror” operation was both inevitable and decisive, dismantling armed formations in Karabakh and opening the door to a sturdier regional security order.
Why Baku moved when it did
The guests said that the three years after the 2020 war were marked by “rotations, re-arming and new fortifications” on the ground, along with fresh mine-laying – signals that the status quo would not self-correct. In their telling, Baku concluded that continued patience risked hardening a military infrastructure next to newly de-occupied areas and slowing the “Great Return” resettlement plan.
According to the analysts, the operation’s design – short, concentrated, and preceded by notification to the Russian peacekeeping contingent – was intended to limit civilian harm while forcing a rapid collapse of the de-facto structures. They pointed to the sub-24-hour timeline as evidence of planning focused on specific military targets rather than population centers.
Yerevan’s misreads – and a later pivot
Both guests linked the September 2023 timeline to what they called a string of provocative signals: a public message from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to de-facto actors on September 2 and the staging of “elections” on September 9. To Baku, they argued, those gestures looked like an attempt to perpetuate an unacceptable ambiguity.
At the same time, they noted that Pashinyan has more recently reframed his domestic narrative – speaking about a “real Armenia,” appealing directly to mothers who fear another war, and floating constitutional change.
For Mollazade and Velizade, the litmus test is a referendum: if held and passed, it would signal that Armenian society has accepted the new reality and wants a durable peace; if it stalls, spoilers will retain leverage.
Signals of de-escalation
The commentators highlighted practical steps that, in their view, show a slow normalization dynamic:
Working-level security contacts: Participation by Armenian security officials in multilateral events in Baku signals willingness to discuss hard security files pragmatically.
Airspace use: Armenian state flights transiting Azerbaijani airspace illustrate confidence that agreed safety protocols will be honored.
They called these building blocks for tackling the most sensitive agenda item: east-west connectivity across Syunik (Zangezur) linking mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Any arrangement, they stressed, will require enforceable rules of the road – clear jurisdiction, monitoring, incident-prevention hotlines, and predictable customs/transit procedures that respect sovereignty while ensuring uninterrupted movement.
A post-status reality
On the political track, both experts said the 2023 action removed the “status question” from the table and, with it, the rationale for the long-dormant Minsk Group. What follows, they argued, should be a sequence of practical files:
Border delimitation and demarcation grounded in agreed baselines.
Connectivity modalities across Syunik with verifiable security arrangements.
Incident-prevention mechanisms to keep minor frictions from escalating.
Phased economic and humanitarian cooperation that creates mutual constituencies for stability.
Impact on the Great Return
At home, the guests said, eliminating an armed enclave next to resettlement zones changed the psychology of returnees and local planners alike. De-mining remains the principal constraint, but the security premium on reconstruction projects has fallen, unlocking faster timelines for utilities, housing, schools, and clinics. They contrasted this with the 1990s, when civilians were the primary targets; by comparison, they cast the 2023 operation as “surgical,” designed to spare civilian areas.
Risks, constraints, and what to watch
Armenian domestic politics: Constitutional reform will likely trigger a fierce campaign. If a referendum succeeds, expect faster progress on delimitation; if it fails, talks could stall.
External spoilers: Any actor – state or non-state – tempted to instrumentalize the corridor debate could inject volatility.
Technical drag: De-mining, financing for large-span bridges and tunnels in mountainous terrain, and 24/7 customs IT integration could slow connectivity even with political green lights.
The analysts’ bottom line
Mollazade and Velizade portrayed September 2023 as a strategic inflection point: it closed the long-running ambiguity in Karabakh, forced a policy rethink in Yerevan, and created manageable – if fragile – conditions for a rules-based security architecture in the South Caucasus. The payoff they envision – recognized borders, safe corridors, and steady people-to-people movement – depends less on declarations than on quiet technical work that reduces friction at the frontier.
If the coming months deliver visible wins – mapped coordinates on the border, a tested security protocol for Syunik transit, and a modest uptick in bilateral trade – the panel believes a self-reinforcing cycle could take hold. Conversely, a stalled referendum or an incident along the prospective route would test whether the new security map drawn in 2023 can hold under stress.
